We investigate whether accusations by the popular press regarding the potential destabilizing force of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment have merit. SWF investments (sales) are associated with a reduction (increase) in the compensation of risk for a three-year (five-year) term. Firm volatility decomposition suggests that it is mainly idiosyncratic risk that drives these impacts. Granger causality results suggest that SWFs are poorly informed in their investments (compared to the market) or they have nonfinancial motivations. There is some evidence that the media coverage precedes the poor performance. These findings suggest that SWF investment could be potentially destabilizing.
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I. Introduction
The popular press is flush with reports on sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs"). Periodicals such as The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, etc (2007)). According to most reports, the funds are expected to grow at an even more impressive rate going forward. Currently, there is approximately $2 ~ $3 trillion in SWFs. Some experts estimate that this will increase to approximately $10 trillion by 2012 (Jen (2007 ). Comparing these amounts to the cumulative amount invested in hedge funds -$1.6 trillion -and recognizing the culpability that is placed on hedge funds in the current economic downturn, the potential implications of SWF investment become obvious.
The popular press implies that there are two major concerns regarding investments of this size by foreign governments. The first is national security, the second, destabilization. An article in The New York Times noted, "The fear is that these so-called sovereign wealth funds could destabilize markets or provoke a political backlash" (Weisman (2007)) . At the firm level it is often suggested that destabilization may be related to non-profit maximizing motives. For the purposes of this paper, we view a destabilizing event as one in which there is a significant decline in the returns of the target firm involved, and (ultimately) one in which the return-to-risk relation of this firm deteriorates.
Although most countries have warmed to foreign investment in general based on its merits (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (2003) ; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) ; Chari and Henry (2008) ; Patro and Wald (2005) ), foreign investment by governments is considerably different.
Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) examine the role of political influence on firm performance and note, "… public enterprises are highly inefficient, and their inefficiency is the result of political pressures from the politicians who control them". The literature on state ownership generally indicates poor firm performance is associated with state investment (e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta (2001); Megginson and Netter (2001) ). Beyond the obvious implications on national security (recall Abu Dhabi"s attempted purchase of several port authorities), it is also possible that investments of this size could potentially destabilize firms. The media suggest that we should be concerned by SWF investment, but is it possible that SWF investment mitigates international risk? Recently, empirical research has found evidence of the monitoring benefits of blockholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ; McConnell and Servaes (1990) ; Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) ; Woidtke (2002) ). Conversely, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Parrino (2006) find that certain types of institutional investors are able 1 The literature has found that blockholder ownership is inversely related to liquidity and positively related to idiosyncratic volatility (Heflin and Shaw (2000) ; Brockman and Yan (2009) ; Xu and Malkiel (2003) ). The findings regarding idiosyncratic risk are especially relevant since the relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns is debated in the literature (e.g., Ang et al. (2006) ; Jiang and Lee (2006); Fu (2009); Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009) ). 2 Indeed, there are two recent cases where a government coerced a company into bringing a SWF"s stake below a more comfortable level (Rossant, Lask, and Griffiths (1986) ). Concerns with inefficiencies resulting from mixing political issues with firm decisions are also found in the literature. In 1986, then U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger suspended a contract between the Department of Defense and a subsidiary of the Italian firm Fiat due to Fiat"s involvement with Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan government through that country"s SWF. The situation became a major public relations issue for Fiat, especially given the Libyan"s refusal to sell the stake initially and the fact that the SWF had two board seats at Fiat. In 1988, the British Government took similar steps when it ordered the Kuwait SWF to cut its stake in British Petroleum by half. The Monopolies and Mergers commission explained its decision by saying, "Unlike other shareholders, Kuwait is a sovereign state with wide strategic interests and could be expected to exercise its influence in support of its own national interest" (Greenspon (1988) ). At the time of the announcement, Kuwait held 21.7% of BP and subsequently reduced its stake to 9.9%. 3 to provide benefits to firms via monitoring, while other types of institutions are not able to do so.
If SWFs are successful in monitoring the targets in which they invest, we would expect to see increases in firm value as documented in prior literature. Some experts suggest that perhaps more dangerous is the protectionism that might follow if countries incorrectly labeled these investments as dangerous. This is a particularly compelling argument right now when there is a fear of protectionism due to the global recession. 3 Perhaps the bottom line is that, based on the growth and the implications of sovereign entities invested in foreign assets, the potential ramifications of SWF investment are undeniable.
Making matters even more precarious, similar to hedge funds and private equity funds, many SWFs do not disclose any information about investments. This lack of information includes intentions with regard to duration and purpose. In fact, there does not exist verifiable evidence that SWFs intend to invest long-term or that they will avoid using large blocks of ownership as bargaining chips in larger political negotiations. Inasmuch as there does not exist an international SEC-like organization to mandate such disclosure, disclosure of investment specifics and fund performance is voluntary. There are attempts by some high-level government officials (and pressure on the IMF) to impose disclosure requirements, but their lack of jurisdiction over many of the nations who have SWFs makes this task difficult, if not impossible. 4 This leaves us with the question of whether investment by sovereign wealth funds mitigates risk or is potentially destabilizing. Does this form of investment increase the volatility (i.e., instability) of firms as the media purports? Do the media play a role in the effect of SWFs?
We address these questions in this paper.
3 Indeed, Alan Greenspan, former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman, recently said, "We have always been the major force pushing (for globalization), and I think for us to be pulling back makes me sad ... because it is not to the best interest of the United States" (AFP Business News (2008)). Stephen Schwarzman, the CEO of the buyout firm Blackstone, a target of China"s SWF, has suggested that in his experience SWF investment is good for a firm. He said, "They're not trying purposely to influence our activities. Our experience with the sovereign wealth funds is that they are smart, they are long-term, and they are highly professional. All they're looking for is the highest rate of return with safety that they can. In that sense, they are really a model type of investors" (Mellor and Lim (2008) ).
We find that investment by sovereign wealth funds is followed by a decline in the return of the target firms. At the same time, the volatility of the target firms decreases, but not enough to compensate investors for risk as set forth by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The deterioration in the return-to-risk relation is especially strong for acquisitions receiving media attention, involving non-G10 target nations, and by oil producing SWFs. A decomposition of firm return volatility suggests that total risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk (relative to return) are not compensated in the same manner following SWF investment as they were before the investment. The decomposition also finds that idiosyncratic risk decreases following SWF investment, which is consistent with the notion that there is a weaker information environment for the firm following SWF investment.
A Granger causality analysis of whether SWFs help better predict future stock returns or return-to-risk ratios provides evidence that SWFs do not provide predictive power in crossborder investments. This is consistent with the literature that claims that foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage (e.g., Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) ). These results are also consistent with SWFs having non-financial motives. The Granger causality tests further provide some evidence that media coverage shares in the culpability of the destabilization, and suggest that SWFs are not well informed when they buy (sell) their investments compared to the market in general.
To our knowledge, there is only one published empirical examination of SWF investment in the literature. Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2009) find positive announcement returns following SWF acquisitions. They also find evidence that SWFs monitor firms. Other papers most similar to ours are working papers by Fotak, Bortolloti, and Megginson (2009 ), Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009 ), Kotter and Lel (2009 ), Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar (2009 and Fernandes (2009). Our paper differs from theirs, with the exception of Fernandes (2009), in that we focus on the potential destabilization related to these funds as opposed to solely their effect on firm performance and monitoring. Our paper differs from Fernandes (2009) in that we focus on the effects of SWFs on volatility and the return-to-risk relation as a means of testing the stabilizing role of SWFs.
These findings may be of interest to policy makers in considering the impact of SWF investment. It may also concern the management and existing shareholders of target firms in that 5 the deterioration of the return-to-risk relation will impact them through holdings of these securities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II presents our empirical methodology. Section III explains the data collection efforts and sources. Section IV presents our empirical results, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. Methodology
Our first step in analyzing the impact of SWF investment is investigating the effect of SWF investments on target firm returns. To do so, we begin by using a market model event study method (see Section IV.A) using local market equity returns, consistent with Fotak, Bortolloti, and Megginson (2009) . This serves two purposes. First, it allows us to isolate the impact of SWF investment on returns. Second, it allows us to establish the consistency of our sample to others in the literature.
Next, we ascertain whether SWF investment has an effect on target firm volatility. As a preliminary analysis, we compare total volatility, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk before and after SWF investment. We follow Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) in using a volatility "event study".
Finally, we examine the relation between SWF investment and the return-to-risk relation of the target firms. To do this we use the Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe (1966) ), the Treynor Ratio (Treynor (1966) ), and a return-to-idiosyncratic volatility ratio in our analysis. At the core of these ratios is the idea that risk and return are positively related (Sharpe (1964); Merton (1973 Merton ( , 1980 ). It is this relation that provides our definition of destabilization: a reduction in these ratios. The purpose of using multiple measures is to evaluate the relation using both a total measure of risk as well as idiosyncratic and systematic components, which is well substantiated in the literature (e.g., Xu and Malkiel (2003) ; Brockman and Yan (2009)). Our regression approach is similar in spirit to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) , who analyze the performance of hedge funds. While using the same ratios mentioned above, they control for factors known to be related to returns as well as ownership specifics. We include similar controls. Thus, we employ an autoregressive (panel) model: 
V is the total volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation of target firm return over month t and is included to be consistent with Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) . , i t SWFI is a dummy variable equal to zero in the months before SWF investment and equal to one in the months after, and , is defined as market value (in $"s).
F is a set of investment-specific information including the percent stake or the dollar amount at month t which is included because the size of the stake involved is found to be related to volatility in Brockman and Yan (2009) , and a dummy variable for whether or not the investment involved a target firm with the same domicile nation as the investing SWF because it is possible that cross-border investments are related differently to volatility than investments within the SWF nation. ℎ , , , , and / , are the volatility ratios for benchmark firm j at time t and are included to control for factors that impact a given industry in a given country over the same period as the SWF investment. 5 We use daily data to estimate a monthly beta and monthly idiosyncratic risk for each firm.
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Estimation is done separately for each of the dependent variables using a random effects procedure.
In the case of all three volatility ratios, a decrease in the ratio indicates that there is now uncompensated risk relative to the prior case as a result of SWF investment or sale. If SWF investment is destabilizing, we would expect to see a negative coefficient for 1,3 , 2,3 and 3,3 .
We can glean information about what aspects of risk are potentially affected by SWF investment by noting the values and any differences across these risk measures.
To gain insight into what we might expect to find with regard to these relations, we look to the literature. Merton (1987) and Barberis and Huang (2001) predict that there should be a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and future expected returns. While Ang et al. (2006) report that firm-level returns are negatively correlated with idiosyncratic risk, both Jiang and Lee following an increase in blockholder ownership. This result suggests that SWF investment would be followed by an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. However, the impact of SWF investment on the information of the firm is unclear a priori as SWFs do not always take control rights via voting shares or board seats. Lins (2003) finds that the uncoupling of control rights from cash flow rights is associated with lower firm values, suggesting that this distinction is 7 The volatility ratios used in our analysis are traditionally defined using excess returns and the volatility of excess returns. We use raw returns in order to avoid a significant decrease in our sample size due to the limited availability of risk-free rates for various countries and periods. For robustness, we estimate the ratios for a reduced sample using excess returns. The results are qualitatively similar and omitted for brevity. They are available upon request.
8 potentially meaningful. His analysis involves large management blocks, but it is possible that the implications of this study could hold more generally to non-management blocks.
Since the effects of cross-listing are related to the internationalization of the shareholder base, this is conceptually similar to SWF investment. Errunza and Miller (2000) find a significant decrease in the cost of capital of cross-listed firms based on this effect. In a survey of the literature, Karolyi (1996) notes that negative returns following cross-listing are related to less sensitivity to market volatility. The cross-listing literature suggests that if firms see a decrease in returns, it should be met with an appropriate reduction in risk. Although this literature has since moved beyond this type of analysis, the infancy of SWF research coupled with the predictions of other strands of literature suggests that examining the return-to-risk relation following SWF investment is a relevant and important first step.
In sum, the suggested impact of SWF investment on the return-to-risk relation is different depending on to which literature one looks. We therefore leave this question to the empirical testing to lead us to the answer.
In order to ascertain whether SWFs have predictive power for future returns of target firms, we evaluate the dynamic causal relation between SWF investment and firm performance.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression:
, where , is the return for firm i at time t and , − is the size of the SWF investment in firm i at time t. The lag length k is selected for two lags, as discussed below. 9 We conduct the analysis using the panel of firms as well as by focusing on individual firms. SWF investment is said to Granger-cause firm return if we reject:
In other words, SWF investment Granger-causes firm returns if lagged SWF investment can predict current firm returns, controlling for past returns. That is, if the null is rejected, SWFs are 9 well informed compared to the market. This specification also allows us to test the net (cumulative) effect of lagged SWF investment. Specifically, we test:
which allows us to test for the sign of the causal relation. For the acquisitions sample, we interpret a positive sign as an indication that SWFs are well informed investors and a negative sign would indicate that SWFs are poorly informed relative to other investors.
We also examine the dynamic relation between SWF investment and volatility and volatility ratios. Specifically, we estimate the following equations:
, where , is the standard deviation of returns for firm i at time t and , / , represents the volatility measures discussed above (i.e., Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio, respectively).
We estimate the above equations at a quarterly frequency over the period from January 1990 to December 2009. This periodicity is chosen due to the infrequent nature of the event considered. We focus on firms that received more than one quarter of SWF investment/sale in the sample period because analysis with only one investment is not practical.
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III. Data
A. Event selection
We first hand-collect SWF acquisitions by creating a list of existing SWFs using LexisNexis Academic Universe and the major world publications represented in that service (as well as documents from Congressional testimony by Edwin M. Truman (2007) ). We perform an 10 article search for each known fund by the name (both current and any previous) of the fund. We also search all known fund investment subsidiaries from the fund"s inception to December 2009. We conduct the search using the fund name and keywords: acquire, purchase, take stake, and similar derivations of these words. This procedure is similar to other papers on SWFs. Funds with at least one event are included in the sample and reported in Table 1. [Insert Table 1 here] Events including bids, share purchases, announcements of intentions to buy or sell stock, and other relevant announcements involving the fund and a publicly traded company are supplemented using fund annual reports and other official fund material. When official materials are unavailable, estimates and popular press reports as well as documents from Congressional testimony mentioned above supplement the data. There are 180 hand-collected events. The size of the transaction and the percent stake in the target company involved are included when available. The date of the event is the day that the information appears in the press. Finally, we collect events by searching SDC Platinum for transactions with a positive value for the data point Sovereign Wealth Fund Flag. Data on both SWF acquisitions and sales are collected. There are approximately 900 (600) SWF acquisitions (sales/divestments). After restricting the events to those involving actual purchases and sales that involve public targets so that we can get returns, the sample is reduced to 170 acquisitions (140 sales).
After restricting the hand-collected sample in the same manner as the SDC sample and combining the two datasets (and deleting replicated observations), we are left with 232 acquisitions and 140 sales.
11 We only include firms for which we find a suitable benchmark and for which we have a full set of return data for the given period.
B. Supplemental data
We collect firm-and market-specific information on the following variables from
Datastream: price, return index, local market index, and market value for all target companies.
Following Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2009), we collect data for a five-year term surrounding the event. This poses a problem for recent events as not enough time has elapsed for the data to be available. These events are therefore dropped from relevant analyses.
The variables included in our regressions are intended to control for relations found in the literature. We include target size in all regressions in keeping with the literature (Ang et al.
(2006)), which controls for possible size effects by including market capitalization as a measure of firm size. To control for the potential difference between cross-border investment and investment within the same country, we include a dummy for investments that involve a target and SWF domiciled in the same nation. Because larger investments can have bigger impacts, we control for the size of the investment as a percent of the target firm"s total assets. We further control for the influence of outliers in the sample by winsorizing the cumulative abnormal returns and volatility ratios at the 5% level to ensure that outliers do not bias results.
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C. Benchmark procedure
We compare the performance of target firms to that of similar firms using a matched pair benchmarking procedure. 13 We match on three criteria: country, industry, and size. Once we have matched on country, we use an industry and size matching procedure to find the matched firms (e.g., Lee and Loughran (1998) ). Industry classification is from Datastream"s Global Industry Classification (e.g., Venkataraman (2001)). First, we find all firms with the same industry classification as the target firm. Second, we rank these firms by market capitalization.
Last, we select the firm with the closest market capitalization at the end of the month prior to the event.
12 Winsorizing does not materially affect results involving only the target firm, although benchmark volatility is higher when not controlling for outliers.
12
D. Summary statistics
Summary statistics and a related correlation matrix for the one-year prior and one-year after SWF acquisition are included in Table 2 . The number of observations in Panel A reflects the number of firm-months in the sample with the exception of investment amount and investment percent, which are only tabulated once per event. In general, we find that the summary statistics for the target and benchmark are similar indicating a reasonably good match.
For example, median return and volatility are roughly the same for the target and benchmark.
The mean stake taken by SWFs in our sample is about 22% with a maximum stake of 100%. Stakes in U.S. firms tend to be smaller relative to the rest of world and are typically under 10%. Consequently, we see that the mean stake is positively skewed and the median stake is 10%.
Approximately 30% of our sample observations have the same domicile countries. The correlation matrix in Panel B provides information about the SWF investment dummy variable.
There is significantly positive correlation between the SWF investment dummy and target volatility, target size and investment amount.
[Insert Table 2 here]
IV. Results
A. Event study
In Table 3 , a significant increase of 1.6% following both SWF acquisitions and sales is seen over trading days -1 to 0. The acquisition results are consistent with Kotter and Lel (2009), and Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2009). More economically significant decreases occur in the longer event windows following SWF acquisitions although we find no significant abnormal returns for SWF sales. We find that the longer the term, the larger the reduction in cumulative abnormal return. The longest window, trading day +1 (i.e., one day after the investment event)
to trading day +250, shows an 11.70% reduction in the return. [Insert Table 3 here]
B. Difference in means tests
In Panel A of Table 4 the results show that raw returns for both target and benchmarkadjusted returns are lower (significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively) in the year following SWF acquisitions. This is consistent with the event study results, which find poor return performance in the year following SWF investment. When the window is extended to three years, only the raw returns remain negative and significant and at five years the change in raw (benchmark-adjusted) return is positive (negative) and significant at the 10% (5%) level. In looking at these target firms alone, the results suggest the firms do poorly in the short term and marginally well in the long term. Once we look at their performance relative to their peers, however, the firms are associated with negative return performance in the short and long term as benchmark-adjusted returns are negative at both the one-year and five-year windows.
Panel A also indicates a change in risk following SWF acquisitions. The benchmarkadjusted standard deviation of returns decreases for one, three, and five years after SWF investment. This result holds for the three-and five-year windows when compared to the target firms" own past performance. Total volatility decreases by anywhere from 15 to 74 basis points, depending on whether the standard deviation is benchmark-adjusted and the time frame. The decreased standard deviation of returns indicates that firms become less volatile following SWF investment and that this reduction seems persistent.
Decomposition of total risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components indicates that the decrease in benchmark-adjusted volatility for the one-, three-, and five-year windows is related to a decrease in idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk is reduced in both the unadjusted and adjusted measures across time. In fact this decrease increases as the time period grows longer. For example, in the unadjusted measure, idiosyncratic risk is reduced by 37 basis points in the three-year window and 84 basis points in the five-year window. Looking at the benchmark-adjusted measure, the risk is reduced by 13% in the one-year window, 27% in the three-year window, and 41% in the five-year window. This decrease in idiosyncratic risk is consistent with the cross-listing literature but inconsistent with the blockholder literature, which finds increased idiosyncratic volatility following blockholder investment. Recall that this predicted relation is at least partially related to better firm information in quantity and quality (Brockman and Yan (2009)). Combining the intuition of both the results and the predictions from the literature suggests that unlike regular blockholders, SWFs are associated with a weaker information environment. We might attribute this difference to 1) the informational disadvantage of foreign investors highlighted in Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) , 2) the reduction in information when a large blockholder does not have monitoring capabilities since they often do not take board seats, or 3) a lack of experience.
Since we find a decrease in return with a corresponding decrease in volatility, it is necessary to examine risk and return together to determine the level of compensated risk associated with SWF investments. Looking to the Sharpe, Treynor, and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratios, we find that relative to its own past performance, targets see a deterioration in the return-to-risk relation for all three volatility ratios at the one-year window (significant at the 1% level). For all three ratios, the reduction in the ratio corresponds to a reduction in the level of compensated risk. There is also deterioration in the Treynor and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratios at the three-year window (significant at the 5% level). Benchmark-adjusted return-to-risk ratios show either a statistically significant decrease in performance using the Treynor Ratio or an insignificant decrease in performance using the Sharpe and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratios in the one-and three-year windows. The five-year window shows a statistically significant decrease (at the 10% level) in the Sharpe ratio.
Looking at these results collectively, we see evidence of destabilization. These impacts are short-term (i.e., one-and three-year terms) when looking at the return/risk ratios. Based on the observed decrease in idiosyncratic risk following SWF investment, poor performance may be due to a weaker information environment for the firm. Unadjusted figures indicate some reversal at the five-year window. These results are consistent with underperformance which reverses at longer horizons, but the reversal is not sufficient to match benchmark performance over the same period. It is also necessary to note here that this analysis does not match sales to acquisitions (due to difficulty based on the information given in SDC Platinum). Table 4 . We do not find a statistically significant difference in either raw or benchmark-adjusted returns for the one-and three-year windows. At the five-year window we find that both raw and benchmark-adjusted returns increase (significant at the 1% level). From a return perspective, SWF sales indicate positive news for firms in the five-year window.
SWF sales are associated with a reduction (significant at the 1% level) in firm risk as measured by standard deviation of returns and idiosyncratic risk in the one-, three-and five-year 15 SDC reports percent owned after the transaction, but it applies to the buying firm not the selling firm.
16 When we exclude firms that are at least partially divested during the holding period, the five-year window we also note that SWFs do not necessarily sell their whole stake in this sample, and thus may still negatively influence the information environment.
The return-to-risk ratios allow us to evaluate the overall relation between SWF sales and subsequent firm performance. We generally find an insignificant relation for the one-and threeyear windows. The five-year window results suggest that SWF sales are associated with an increase in the compensation of risk as all three ratios increase in this period (significant at the 1% level). Benchmark-adjusted ratios lead to the same general conclusion. Overall, firms sold
by SWFs see an improvement in long-term performance as return is increased and total risk is decreased. Thus, as SWFs become more removed from the target, the performance improves.
This may be due to an improved information environment after the SWF divests or that SWFs are exiting formerly distressed firms after the target has stabilized.
The second graph in Figure 1 shows the average volatility ratios for SWF sales from the five years prior to the sale to five years after. The Sharpe Ratio and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio are increasing in the five years leading up to the sale, decrease in the year after the sale and then continue the increase over three and five years. This trend is consistent with SWFs selling recently improved performers.
C. Panel regressions
Panel A of Table 5 displays results examining comprehensive return-to-risk ratios for target firms in the one-, three-, and five-year windows following SWF investment. Using ratios that evaluate the return-to-risk relation enables us to gain further insight into firm performance following SWF investment. Respective volatility ratios (i.e., Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, and return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio) are the dependent variables in our regressions where these ratios are defined in equations (1) -(3).
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The marginal effect of SWF investment on the Sharpe Ratio is -0.027 and -0.014 for the one-(significant at the 1% level) and three-year (significant at the 5% level) windows, respectively (specifications 1 and 2). The negative and significant coefficient meshes nicely with the findings in Table 4 and indicates that after SWF investment, we see uncompensated total risk relative to before the event. In other words, although the firm"s return has decreased, we don"t see a sufficient corresponding decrease in total risk to preserve the return-to-risk relation.
The marginal effect of SWF investment on the Treynor Ratio is -0.001 in the one-year window (specification 4) and is significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that there is uncompensated systematic risk following SWF investment. The deterioration in this relation is evidence of destabilization at the firm level. This result may also be of interest to short-term investors in firms receiving SWF investment as it indicates that non-diversifiable risk is no longer compensated at the same level.
The marginal effect of SWF investment on the return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio is -0.034 (significant at the 1% level) and -0.010 (significant at the 10% level) for the one-and three-year windows, respectively. Here we see that there is uncompensated idiosyncratic risk following SWF investment. Although the benchmark-adjusted return and idiosyncratic risk move in the same direction as predicted by Jiang and Lee (2006) and Fu (2009), it seems that the idiosyncratic risk level has not adjusted enough to preserve the pricing relation prior to the event with SWF investments.
Taking the results collectively, the volatility ratios provide the most convincing evidence in the paper thus far regarding the potential destabilization effect of SWF investment. The statistically significant negative coefficient in the Sharpe, Treynor, and idiosyncratic risk ratios indicates that the decreased return experienced by target firms is not compensated by a sufficient corresponding decrease in risk for these same firms in the one-and three-year windows.
Panel B shows results following SWF sales. The marginal effect of SWF investment on the Sharpe Ratio is approximately -0.021 (significant at the 10% level) and 0.030 (significant at the 1% level) for the one-and five-year windows, respectively. The results suggest 17 Note that we make no comment as to a "correct" return-to-risk relation but rather just document the changes in the relation following SWF investment.
18 uncompensated risk in the one-year following SWF sales, but an improvement in the compensation of risk in the five-year window. The marginal effect of SWF sales on the Treynor
Ratio is a positive 0.001, significant at the 1% level for the five-year window. There is improvement in the compensation of systematic risk following SWF sales.
The marginal effect of SWF sales on the return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio is 0.031 (significant at the 1% level) for the five-year window. Again, there is improvement in the compensation of risk following SWF sales. Combined with the acquisition results, the volatility ratios suggest that SWFs involvement is not positive news for firms. Performance deteriorates following investment and improves following sales.
If risk is not compensated as well during investment in these targets, management and existing shareholders of the target firm, who are often concerned with short-term investment horizons, should be cautious about investment by these blockholders. In fact, the SWFs themselves should be concerned too. Although some of these SWFs assert that they are longterm investors (in which case short-term impacts may be inconsequential), managers in these funds often need to substantiate interim performance to high-ranking government officials.
[Insert Table 5 here]
If SWF investment is in fact destabilizing, as the results in Table 5 imply, does the media play a role in the destabilization, or will especially destabilizing events be more likely to receive media attention? If either of these is the case, we would expect to see a lack of statistical significance for the non-media sub sample, or at least a considerable difference between the volatility ratios for the media and non-media sub-samples. Tetlock (2007) shows that media pessimism predicts negative market returns. In a recent working paper, Liu, Sherman, and
Zhang (2008) find evidence in the IPO market that suggests media attention is related to permanent changes in investor demand for a given firm. Consequently, we believe it is reasonable to expect that the sample involving media mention may behave differently than the non-media mention sample. Our sample of media events consists of transactions that appear in any of the major publications covered in the LexisNexis database.
Panel A of Table 6 shows these results for acquisitions. We see that the decrease in the Sharpe ratio following SWF investment of the target firms is driven mainly by the media sample.
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The magnitude and significance of the negative relation between SWF investment and the Sharpe ratio is greater for the media sample (-0.045 significant at 1% versus and insignificant -0.018) in the one-year window. The difference for the two samples is also statistically significant (at the 1% level). That said, the marginal effect of SWF investment in those events not mentioned in the media is negative and significant at the three-year window. Although the media tends to cover larger, more visible firms and investments, control variables in the specifications control for these differences. These results imply that the media may be somewhat culpable for the immediate reduction in compensated risk but that the bulk of the reduction would happen anyway, albeit delayed.
The decrease in the Treynor ratio is driven mainly by the media sample in the one-year window. The effect is negative and significant for both samples, but is larger for the media sample and the difference is significant (at the 1% level). Results for the return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio show a similar pattern for the one-year window. The media sub-sample shows a negative and significant (at the 1% level) effect of SWF investment on return per unit of idiosyncratic risk that is more than twice the effect of the non-media sample and the difference is statistically significant (at the 1% level). This disparate effect suggests that the media mention leads to a larger reduction in return per unit of idiosyncratic risk. This in turn suggests that the fears of the media are potentially well founded, albeit somewhat self-inflicted.
We also examine the role of market development. Specifically, we categorize nations as developed (G10 nations) or less developed (non-G10 nations). We find a negative and significant relation between SWF investment and the target Sharpe ratio only in the case of the less developed target nations (-0.034 and -0.014 both significant at 1%) in the one-and threeyear windows. We also see a statistically significant difference between the two samples for the one-year window (at the 10% level). This result is consistent with the notion that less developed nations may be more susceptible to the possible destabilizing effects of SWFs.
The negative relation between SWF investment and the target Treynor ratio is also driven by less developed target nations. Again, the relation is only significant in the non-G10 sample and the difference between the two samples is statistically significant (at the 5% level). This evidence is also consistent with targets from less developed nations being more likely to experience destabilization related to SWF investment.
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Results for the return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio reveal that results are driven by the non-G10 sample for the one-year window in terms of magnitude and significance, and the difference between the two samples is statistically significant (at the 5% level). We find that the firm-level risk ratios are driven by less developed target nations suggesting that firms in more developed nations may not be susceptible to destabilization related to SWF investment.
Finally, we examine if there are differences in performance between oil producing and non-oil producing nations. We find the Sharpe ratio reduction is confined to the oil producing
SWFs. This suggests that it is only SWFs from oil-producing nations that are related to the observed negative performance following SWF acquisitions. Results for the Treynor Ratio indicate similar results in the one-year window in that we see a significantly larger impact in the oil-producing SWF nations (0.00 at the 1% level). We find that a reduction in the Treynor Ratio is only present in the three-year window for oil-producing SWFs.
Similarly, the reduction in the return to idiosyncratic ratio is stronger in the one-year window and is only present in the three-year window for oil producing SWFs. For all three ratios, the difference between the two samples is statistically significant. Overall, the results suggest that oil producing SWFs are related to worse performance than non-oil producing SWFs.
It is possible that oil-producing SWFs are poorly informed or are at a disadvantage in information production, which leads to the observed poor performance. However, the poor performance may also be related to oil-producing SWFs desire to diversify oil revenues by investing in non-oil related targets 18 or that there are nonfinancial motives for their investment and that the performance of the target is not of primary importance to this investor.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results of the volatility ratio sub-sample regressions using the SWF sales as the event of interest. The sales data are based on events solely from SDC; as a result, no media sub-sample is available. In Panel B there is little difference between G10 and 18 Another explanation for SWF performance may be that the lack of disclosure by SWFs is related to the poor performance. In a previous version of this paper we presented results comparing SWF performance based on the disclosure level of the fund and did not find a significant difference. This is suggestive evidence that motives other than profit maximization may explain observed performance.
non-G10 target nations for any of the three volatility ratios in the one-and three-year windows.
In the five-year window, the increase in all three ratios is present only in the non-G10 sample although the difference between samples is only significant for the Sharpe Ratio. This is the same group that saw a reduction in compensated risk following SWF acquisitions, which suggests that targets in less developed nations are recouping the negative effects of the SWF investments.
The results in Panel B show that sales by oil producing SWFs are associated with a reduction for all three volatility ratios in the one-year window. An increase in all three ratios is present for sales by non oil producing nations in the five-year window although the differences between samples are statistically insignificant. Combining these facts with the acquisition sample, the results suggest that oil producing SWFs select targets that perform poorly following their investment, and this poor performance continues after the oil producing SWFs sell the firm.
D. Granger causality
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results for Granger causality tests for the full panel for return, volatility, and return-to-risk measures following SWF acquisitions. As in equations (4)- (8), the joint and cumulative significance of past information regarding SWF investment are tested and reported. We restrict our sample to those firms receiving more than one SWF investment since Granger causality is concerned with dynamic effects. As a result, our sample for the causality analysis is limited to fourteen firms in the acquisitions sample and thirteen firms in the sales sample.
In the full sample results, we find no significant causal relations. One interpretation of this is that SWFs in general are not well informed investors compared to the market in general.
Based on the literature that suggests that domestic investors have an informational advantage over foreign investors (e.g., Dvorak (2005); Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005)), we analyze same country and cross-border sub-samples. We find no Granger-causal relation for either sample.
Thus, both groups are not well informed and there is not an observable difference between the two groups with respect to which is better informed. Another interpretation of these results is that SWFs have motives that are nonfinancial. Although we cannot conclude based on these results that SWFs are investing for reasons different than the average investor (i.e., financial), we 22 cannot reject this hypothesis either. The absence of this rejection leaves room for the allegations set forth by the media to be true.
Cross sectional results suggest that the media may be related to negative SWF performance. For the sample of acquisitions receiving media mention we find a negative and significant causal relation for all three volatility ratios. No causal relation is found for the nonmedia sample. For example, for the Sharpe Ratio, we find some evidence that the media events have predictive power for the negative performance. This may be due to the media somehow anticipating the poor performance, or perhaps more likely it may be due to the media being more likely to cover investments that perform poorly. One potential reason for this is that the media is better informed than SWFs and reports mostly in these cases. It is also possible that poorly performing SWF investments are associated with bailout motives, which are more likely to receive media mention.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Panel B of Table 7 reports Granger causality results for the target return, volatility, and return-to-risk measures following SWF sales. The sales results show no significant cumulative Granger-causal relation in either the full sample or the sub-samples. This suggests that SWF sales are not well informed.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for Granger causality tests at the firm level for return, volatility, and return-to-risk measures following SWF acquisitions. 19 As discussed above, we conduct the Granger causality tests on the fourteen firms in the sample that received more than one SWF investment in the sample period. We report the results based on whether or not the target received investment only from foreign SWFs, only from domestic SWFs, or a mix of foreign and domestic investment.
With respect to returns, two of the fourteen firms show a significant causal relation between SWF investment and firm return. Both Citigroup and Mirvac Group show a significant (5% and 1%, respectively) causal relation in the joint tests. The cumulative test is significant only for Mirvac Group. These results are consistent with event study results reported earlier.
The results indicate that SWF investment Granger-causes a decrease in return for at least some
19 Table 8 provides a summary of the results at the firm level provided in Appendix A.
23 firms in the sample: SWF investment has additional predictive power for a lower return in the presence of the past returns. The majority of cases reveal no significant relation, which suggests that SWFs are not well informed investors. The presence of a negative effect in some cases suggests that these SWFs may be poorly informed relative to other investors. In both cases of negative effects, the acquiring nation is United Arab Emirates and the investment is across SWF borders. The United Arab Emirates funds are included in the oil producing sample, which we found to be associated with negative performance in the cross-section results.
Three of the fourteen firms in the sample show a significant causal relation with respect to firm risk. ICICI Bank and Kerzner International show significant (at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively) negative cumulative effects of SWF investment. Additionally, the joint test also reveals a significant relation for Merrill Lynch. These results suggest that SWF investment is not only correlated with firm volatility, but also that the relation is causal. All three of the firms with significant relations involved cross-border investments, suggesting in these cases that the SWF investment contained additional information controlling for past volatility. Two of the fourteen firms show a significant causal relation with respect to the firm"s Sharpe ratio. Matrix
Laboratories and Mirvac Group show a significant (at the 1% level) negative causal relation in the cumulative test. As in the panel regressions, we find that SWF investment is associated with a deterioration in the return/total risk relation. Both firms received cross-border investment, suggesting that at least in these two cases, cross-border investment is linked to a negative causal relation to performance.
Two firms in the sample, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, show a significant causal relation in both the joint and cumulative tests with respect to the Treynor ratio. The cumulative effect of SWF investment on the Treynor ratio is positive in both cases. This suggests that for these firms, SWF investment leads to improvement in the return/systematic risk relation. Both of these firms received investments from foreign investments and both firms were facing distress at the time of investment. Thus, consistent with Kotter and Lel (2009), we find that firms facing distress are associated with positive performance following SWF investment. Finally, we examine the dynamic relation between SWF investment and the return-to-idiosyncratic risk ratio. One firm, Mirvac Group shows statistically significant deterioration in the return/idiosyncratic risk relation.
Ipoh shows a marginally significant improvement in the relation.
We find that, for some firms, return is negatively affected by SWF investment and that this reduction is not sufficiently compensated by a decrease in total, systematic, or idiosyncratic risk. We find a significant causal relation between SWF investment and at least one of the dependent variables discussed above for seven firms in our causality sample. The negative cumulative effect on performance for some firms suggests that those SWFs are poorly informed or that they have nonfinancial motives, and in our sample this consists of funds from United Arab Emirates in cross-border investments.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results for Granger causality tests at the firm level for return, volatility, and return-to-risk measures following SWF sales. We are able to conduct tests for 13 firms that have had more than one selling event involving SWFs over the period examined. The cumulative test of the effect of SWF sales on return is significant only in the case of ST Capital. This result suggests that SWF sales are associated with improving performance.
Generally, the lack of significance in most tests suggests that SWFs are not well informed when selling.
The volatility results show that SWF sales Granger-cause a reduction in volatility for
Singapore Computer Systems and Singapore Food Industries. In the volatility ratio results we find only one significant relation. We find that sales Granger-cause an increase in the Sharpe Ratio for ST Capital. The firms that exhibit a significant Granger-causal relation are all Singapore firms and involve Singapore SWFs. In general, we conclude that SWFs are not generally informed investors. As we have a limited sample for the Granger-causality tests we should exercise caution in deriving implications from these results.
V. Conclusions
SWF investment has received increasing attention in the literature. The drastic increase in the size and visibility of SWFs has recently stirred up controversy about their potential to threaten the stability of firms (among other things). This paper examines the effect of SWF events on the level of compensated risk of target firms and the information possessed by SWFs.
We find that SWF investments are associated with a statistically significant decrease in firm return performance, and a statistically significant short-and long-term decrease in total firm risk and idiosyncratic risk. After the first year, SWF sales are associated with a reduction in risk and an improvement in return. Collectively, we find that there is in fact evidence to support the contention that SWF investment is destabilizing.
While we use a limited sample of SWFs, Granger causality results suggest that SWF acquisitions may not be well informed when they invest compared to the market in general in that they do not help better predict returns or return/risk ratios. SWFs are likewise not well informed when selling. Although these results raise additional questions as to SWF investment motivation, they provide some evidence to support the insinuations set forth by the popular press in recent months (at least for some forms of investment and in some nations). The panel regression results regarding the media coverage sub-sample suggest that in their coverage of SWF news, the media may be partly culpable for the very negative characteristics that they report to fear (i.e., destabilization). Granger causality tests on this sub-sample provide some evidence that the media coverage has some predictive power for firm performance. It is possible that the media is more likely to cover destabilizing events but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the media Granger-causes some of these effects.
The observed poor performance of SWF acquisitions may be related to the funds propensity to invest in distressed assets which they are unable to turn around. The poor SWF performance may also be related to our finding that the funds are not well informed. Specifically, our results suggest that oil-producing funds are poorly informed, especially in the case of crossborder investments. Perhaps most daunting, however, is that we cannot put to rest the allegations that these SWFs have nonfinancial motivations such as resource-based diversification or political agendas.
These results may be of interest to policy makers of both developed and less developed nations, both of which are debating the merits of leaving their borders open to foreign investment by sovereign investors. This is particularly important now that the IMF has reversed its position on capital controls suggesting that nations with some capital controls are faring better in the global financial crisis than those without. They may also be of interest to management and the existing shareholders of potential target firms since they are both directly impacted by these results in the short-term. We intend to research additional topics in SWF investment such as whether political relations between the target domicile and SWF nations factor into target choice.  . Market Return is the average daily log difference of the index related to given target over month t. Investment (%) is the percent stake that was reported for the event. Investment ($) is the amount of the stake involved in millions of US$. Same Country is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the SWF and target are domiciled in the same nation and zero otherwise. Oil Producing (G10) is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if the SWF is from an (a) oil producing (G10) nation and zero otherwise. Media is a dummy vari able which takes on a value of one if the investment was covered by the media and zero otherwise. SWF Investment is a dummy variable equal to zero before SWF purchase and equal to one after. N is the number of observations used in our analysis. 
Table 4 Difference in Means Tests
The variables of interest are defined as in Table 5 Volatility Ratios
The following volatility ratio regressions are specified: 
We use raw return for the numerator of these volatility ratios. The Sharpe (Treynor) Table 6 Volatility Ratios for Sub-samples
For the numerator of these volatility ratios, we use raw return. The Sharpe (Treynor) Table 8 Individual Firm Granger Causality Figure 1 . Graphs for Benchmark Adjusted Volatility Ratios. 
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